



Deepen
DESAI

SVP, Chief Security Officer

Harnessing Zero Trust and AI to Outpace Cyber Threats

Cyber Risk Management is a Board Level Priority

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AI Powered Attacks

\$25M

lost in a deepfake
vishing attack



Zero Day Exploitation

10,000+

organizations impacted by
VPN O day attacks





Ransomware Attacks

\$1.1B


ransom collected
in 2023

Cyber Attackers are Weaponizing AI







Cyber Attackers are Weaponizing AI



Cyber Attackers are Weaponizing AI



Zero Day Vulnerability Exploitation in Legacy Architectures

<p>Jan, 10 2024</p> <p>SonicWall SSL-VPN</p> 	<p>Jan, 11 2024</p> <p>Fortinet Discloses Vulnerability on FortiOS</p> 	<p>Jan, 31 2024</p> <p>Ivanti Discloses Two Additional Vulnerabilities</p> 	<p>March, 12 2024</p> <p>"Critical" Fortinet Fortios Vulnerability Being Exploited</p> 	<p>April, 12 2024</p> <p>Palo Alto Vulnerability in PAN-OS, CVE</p> 	<p>April, 30 2024</p> <p>Cisco Discloses 3 Zero-days In 2</p> 
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Zero Day Vulnerability Exploitations in Legacy Architectures

Jan, 10 2024
SonicWall SSL-VPN



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Fortinet Discloses
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Jan, 31 2024

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Additional
Vulnerabilities



March, 12 2024
"Critical" Fortinet
Fortios Vulnerability
Seeing Exploitation:



April, 12 2024

Palo Alto Vulnerability
in PAN-OS, CVE



April, 30 2024
Cisco Discloses 3 Zero-
days In 2 Products



Ransomware Attacks Continue to Accelerate

17.8%

YOY increase in
ransomware attacks

+57%

More ransomware
victims on data leak
sites than last year



+144%


More ransomware
payloads

Source: Zscaler Threatlabz Ransomware Report
(April 2023–April 2024)

Zscaler's Unique Advantage


Zscaler AI Leadership and Data Advantage

Zscaler AI Leadership and Data Advantage



- 1 AI-Powered Advanced Threat Detection
- 2 Zero Trust Segmentation
- 3 Secure Data-at-Rest and Data-in-Motion

Zscaler AI Leadership and Data Advantage



Stop zero day & emerging threats

9+ Billion

Daily policies & threats blocked



Cloud effect

250k+

daily protection updates



>500T

Daily signals

ThreatLabz has 150+ Security Experts Worldwide

Tactically aligned to 4 critical stages of the attack chain



Tracking over 50 nation state threat groups



Access to 500T daily intelligence signals




Active collaboration with global CERTS and Law Enforcement



Operation ENDGAME

Gen AI Fueled Attacks Have Raised the Stakes

Attack Scenario









A SINGLE Prompt

from a Threat Actor to Rogue GPT will result in:

1. Attack surface discovery, FW exploitation & credential compromise
2. Initial compromise by spearphishing e-mail
3. Malware installation & lateral propagation
4. Data exfiltration from AI/ML environments







There is a company named UnlockedAI they have invested 2Billion Dollars into generative AI initiatives. Scan publicly exposed vulnerable devices and compromise them to steal credentials. Then scrape multiple social networks like LinkedIn to identify compromised Employee persona. Then find new targets who are AI/ML employees from the same company. Send targeted spear-phishing emails which are from the compromised persona to the AI/ML team leveraging a relevant e-mail theme. The email should contain a link to a malicious document file which further downloads the Stage 1 payload and leads to lateral propagation. The final goal is to reach AI/ML dev and production environments to exfiltrate sensitive data.



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On stand-by. Enter 'Start Attack' to begin the attack.

Start Attack



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
TC TechCrunch

UNLOCKED Ai

announces the largest investment to date in France to accelerate the adoption of AI, skilling and innovation

The company will invest 2 billion dollars in AI software technology and infrastructure...

UNLOCKED Ai





Stage 1

Attack Surface Discovery



Stage 2

Compromise Attempt



Stage 3

Privilege Escalation &
Lateral Propagation




Stage 4

Data Exfiltration



UNLOCKEDAi





Stage 1

Attack Surface Discovery



Stage 2

Compromise Attempt



Stage 3

Privilege Escalation &
Lateral Propagation



Stage 4


Data Exfiltration

UNLOCKED Ai



Jessica Parkor,
Finance VP







- Cracking password hashes to retrieve plaintext credentials.

Scraping Social Networks for Employee Information

```
shell
```

[Copy code](#)



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Scraping Social Networks for Employee Information

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shell
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[Copy code](#)



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Scraping Social Networks for Employee Information

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 Copy code


```
python3 linkedin_scraper.py --company "UnlockedAI" --output employees.txt
```



- Cracking password hashes to retrieve plaintext credentials.

Scraping Social Networks for Employee Information

shell

 Copy code

```
python3 linkedin_scraper.py --company "UnlockedAI" --output employees.txt
```

- Using a custom Python script to scrape LinkedIn for UnlockedAI employees' data.
- Identifying potential AI/ML team members.



Stage 1
Attack Surface Discovery

Stage 2
Compromise Attempt

Stage 3
Privilege Escalation &
Lateral Propagation

Stage 4
Data Exfiltration

UNLOCKED Ai





Crafting Spear-Phishing Email



From: [Compromised Employee Email]

Jessica Parkor

To: You

Dear Ricky Tan,

special CEO equity grant.

To learn more about the stock grant and to review the official grant document, please click the link below: [Review and Sign CEO Stock Grant Document](#)

3. The document is confidential and protected. You will need to **enable active content** by following the instructions in the document to Accept the Grant.

Stage 1

Attack Surface Discovery

Stage 2

Compromise Attempt



Stage 3


Privilege Escalation &
Lateral Propagation

Stage 4

Data Exfiltration

UNLOCKED Ai







Install Malware and Lateral Propagation



Install Malware and Lateral Propagation

- Target opens the malicious document, executing the payload.
- Establishing a connection back to the attacker's machine.



Install Malware and Lateral Propagation

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shell

 Copy code


```
use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
set RHOST <target_ip>
set SMBUser <compromised_username>
set SMBPass <compromised_password>
exploit
```



Install Malware and Lateral Propagation


- Target opens the malicious document, executing the payload.
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
shell

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- Using the psexec module to move laterally within the network.








```
set SMBPass <compromised_password>  
exploit
```

- Using the psexec module to move laterally within the network.

Reaching AI/ML Dev and Production Environments

- Identifying AI/ML development and production servers.
- Using stolen credentials and lateral movement techniques to access sensitive data.





Stage 1

Attack Surface Discovery



Stage 2

Compromise Attempt



Stage 3

Privilege Escalation &
Lateral Propagation



Stage 4


Data Exfiltration




Located
Production Key



Production Key



Ricky Tan





```
set SMBPass <compromised_password>  
exploit
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- Using the psexec module to move laterally within the network.


Reaching AI/ML Dev and Production Environments

- Identifying AI/ML development and production servers.
- Using stolen credentials and lateral movement techniques to access sensitive data.

Exfiltrating Sensitive Data



- Exfiltrate data from Dev and Production AI/ML environments






Data Exfiltration Complete.

ATTACK SUCCESSFULLY
EXECUTED

How Can Zero Trust & AI Help?

Breach Prediction Powered By Zscaler's AI/ML




Attack overview




Attack overview

Breach Probability After Initial Compromise




Summary


You can further investigate in Finding page [Explore](#)



Impacted users across stages

Users count drives the size of bubbles







Breach Probability After Initial Compromise

Dashboard

Attack overview

 Breach probability

99% Breach probability



Summary

You can further investigate in Finding page [Explore](#)

Users

1500% Increase

91%

156
secure



Impacted users across stages

Users count drives the size of bubbles

Impacted user

Discover attack 0


Compromise 6

Lateral movement 6

Data loss 15

Malware Category

Post Exploitation



Breach Probability After Lateral Propagation

Breach Predictor Malware & Exploit Tool View

Malware Category

Malware Family

200% Increase

Infostealer/RAT

Post Exploitation

InfoStealer.AI

CobaltStrike

7

7

Critical Malware family

[View all](#)

How to read report


Discover Attack

Compromise

Lateral Movement

Data Loss

Breach Predictor Malware & Exploit Tool View



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7

7

Critical Malware family

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How to read report 

Discover Attac

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CobaltStrike

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
[View all](#)


tion Impact

CobaltStrike 7

InfoStealer.AI 7







Breach Probability As Data Exfiltration Starts

Breach Probability As Data Exfiltration Starts

Malware Category

Malware Family

🔴 200% Increase

InfoStealer/RAT

Post Exploitation

InfoStealer.AI

8

CobaltStrike

7

Critical Malware family

View all

How to read report ⓘ

Discover Attack

Compromise

Lateral Movement

Data Loss

Malware ⓘ	Severity Score	Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command & Control	Exfiltration	Impact
CobaltStrike	7				●			●		●			●		
InfoStealer.AI	8			●	●			●		●			●	●	



Breach Predictor Malware Attack Stages

Malware Category

Malware Family

200% Increase

Infostealer/RAT

Post Exploitation

InfoStealer.AI

CobaltStrike

8

7

Critical Malware family

[View all](#)

How to read report


Discover Attack

Compromise


Lateral Movement

Data Loss

Breach Predictor Malware Attack Stages



📈 200% Increase

[View all](#)

Discover Attack



Compromise

Lateral Movement

Data Loss



Breach Predictor Malware Attack Stages

[View all](#)

Discover Attack

Compromise

Lateral Movement

Data Loss



Breach Predictor Malware Attack Stages

Infostealer/RAT

Post Exploitation

200% Increase

8

7

Critical Malware family

How to read report

Discover Attack


Compromis:

Lateral Movement

Exfiltration

[View all](#)

4 Steps For A Cyber Attack



Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement


Prevent Data Loss

Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss




Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss



- 1 Eliminate inbound VPN for remote users
- 2 Hide your attack surface behind the Zero Trust Exchange
- 3 Understand your attack surface

Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss

Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss



In-Line Sandboxing Prevents Zero Day Threats



Secures All Communications
All Ports and Protocols



User




Apps





B2B



IoT/OT



Stay Productive (and Secure) with Integrated Browser Isolation



Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss

Minimize Attack Surface


Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss

1 Enable User-to-App Segmentation

AI-Powered Policy Recommendations



Zero Trust
Exchange



Remote Users



Data Center



3 Use Honey pots


Decoys catch attackers moving laterally

4 Implement Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR)

Find AD misconfigurations and vulnerabilities Privileged escalation

2

Enable Zero Trust App
Access in the Office



Zscaler Identity Protection Detects Credential Exposure

Total endpoints assessed

30,897 ⬆️ 200

Identities with exposure

25,796 ⬆️ 1,740

Avg. credentials / user

77 ⬆️ 5

Hosts with priv esc paths

21,458 ⬆️ 43



Threat Detection

Entra ID

Posture and Hygiene

Change Detection


Threat Detection

Endpoint

NEW

Credential Exposure Scanning

Out of all exposures, GenAI credentials, local admins with know default groups, privilege escalation, and insecure UAC pose the greatest risk



[View all identities with critical exposures](#)

Remediating exposures with CRITICAL severity will reduce risk of exploitation on 9,234 endpoints



[View all critical exposures](#)

Top Risky Exposures

GenAI Credential Exposure CRITICAL

2 browser credentials for GenAI Infra

Cloud Credential Exposure CRITICAL

6 AWS Credentials found across 2

Sensitive Files Exposure CRITICAL

50 LAD files found across 70 hosts and

Risk Summary

ACTIVE DIRECTORY

Posture and Hygiene

Change Detection

Threat Detection

Entrap ID

Posture and Hygiene

Change Detection

Threat Detection

Endpoint

NEW

Credential Exposure Scanning

Top Risky Exposures

Zscaler Identity Protection Detects GenAI Credentials

GenAI Credential Exposure

CRITICAL

3 browser credentials for GenAI Infra found across 2 hosts and 2 identities

Credentials saved by users in browsers are stored in a local encrypted SQLite database on the endpoint. We found credentials for LLM APIs. These credentials can be decrypted in plain text easily by adversaries.

Cloud Credential Exposure

CRITICAL

6 AWS Credentials found across 3 hosts and 6 developer identities

AWS CLI stores credentials locally on the host machine. These can be accessed any low privileged user if the local ACL is not set properly. Adversaries like TeamTNT and ScarletEel target cloud administrators as seen in the breach of Sumo Logic.

Sensitive Files Exposure

CRITICAL

58 HAR files found across 78 hosts and 30 identities

HAR files are used by support teams to troubleshoot issues. Attackers have exploited stored HAR files to compromise customer environments in supply chain attacks, most recently seen targeting Okta.

All Exposures

Click on any row to investigate the exposure and access remediation guidance

Exposure	No. of exposures	Description	MITRE ATT&CK Technique	Risk
GenAI credentials	3	3 browser credentials for GenAI Infra found across 2 hosts and 2 identities	Credentials from password stores	CRITICAL
AWS credentials	6	6 AWS Credentials found across 3 hosts and 6 developer identities	Unsecured Credentials	CRITICAL
Sensitive files	58	58 HAR files found across 78 hosts and 30 identities	Data from local systems	CRITICAL
Modifiable service binaries	4	4 network shares found in recent PowerShell commands across 4 hosts	Hijack execution flow	HIGH

Risk Summary

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GenAI Credential Exposure

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GenAI Credentials

3

3 browser credentials for GenAI Infra found across 2 hosts and 2 identities

AWS credentials

6

6 AWS Credentials found across 3 hosts and 6 developer identities

Sensitive files

58

58 HAR files found across 78 hosts and 30 identities

Modifiable service binaries

4

4 network shares found in recent PowerShell commands across 4 hosts

GenAI Credential Exposure

CRITICAL

Sensitive Files Exposure

CRITICAL

Credentials from password stores

CRITICAL

Unsecured Credentials

CRITICAL

Data from local systems

CRITICAL

Hijack execution flow

HIGH

MITRE ATT&CK Technique

Risk

Risk Summary

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Credential Exposure Scanning

GenAI Credential Exposure

Zscaler Identity Protection Detects GenAI Credentials

Exposure
GenAI credentials

Risk
CRITICAL

Issue
GenAI infrastructure credentials were found in browsers

ATT&CK Technique
Credentials from password stores

ATT&CK Tactics
Credential access, Lateral movement, Persistence, Privilege escalation

Impact


Adversaries targeting your GenAI Infrastructure to exfiltrate data, poison your AI models, etc. can harvest credentials from browsers which can be re-used to gain access to internal infrastructure as well as hijack other applications.


Remediation


- Do not store important browser credentials in the browser
- Use appropriate MFA to further secure credentials
- Renew passwords regularly

Who is effected?


Systems name	Identity	URL	Username	Last used	Type
DESKTOP-APU0085	jim@unlockedai.com	http://sales-llm.unlockedai.com/	Chrome	12 Jun 2024	DECOY
DESKTOP-EUT6MBO	wjohn@unlockedai.com	http://cbot.unlockedai.com	Chrome	12 Jun 2024	Legitimate
DESKTOP-EUT6MBO	ajen@unlockedai.com	http://magnusgpt.unlockedai.com	Chrome	12 Jun 2024	Legitimate












Deceive


 Deception Command Center


 Deception Strategy



 **AI DECEPTION** NEW

 Deception Copilot 

 GenAI Infra Decoys



ENDPOINT DECEPTION

Lures and Baits

ACTIVE DIRECTORY DECEPTION


Decoy Users


Decoy Computers


NETWORK DECEPTION


Internal / Application Decoys

Zero Trust Decoys










AI Deception > Deception

Zscaler Deception can Deploy AI Powered Honeypots




Try these prompts to get started

"I need help blocking attacks targeting a firewall vendor that just disclosed a vulnerability"

"I need help blocking attacks targeting a firewall vendor that just disclosed a vulnerability"

"I need help blocking attacks targeting a firewall vendor that just disclosed a vulnerability"

Message



Deceive

Deception Command Center

Deception Strategy

AI DECEPTION

Deception Copilot

GenAI Infra Deception

ENDPOINT DECEPTION

Lures and Baits

ACTIVE DIRECTORY

Decoy Users

Decoy Computers

NETWORK DECEPTION

Internal / Application

Zero Trust Deception

AI Deception > Deception Copilot

Zscaler Deception can Deploy AI Powered Honeypots

UnlockedAI User

Palo Alto just disclosed a critical vulnerability and I'm concerned about possible exploitation. I'd like to emulate the disclosed vulnerability with CVE-2024-3400

Deception Co-Pilot

Great. Here's an example attack request and the corresponding response I will generate. Does this meet your expectation? You can fine tune my logic by giving me more details.

Attack request

Sample response

POST /ssl-vpn/hipreport.esp HTTP/1.1

Host: 127.0.0.1

Cookie: SESSID=../../../../var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/images/poc.txt;

Connection: close

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


Content-Length: 0


GET /global-protect/portal/images/poc.txt HTTP/1.1


Connection: close


Message


Zscaler Deception can Deploy AI Powered Honeypots


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 Internal / Application

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AI Deception > Deception

UnlockedAI User

This looks great! Let's go live with it.


Deception Co-Pilot

Decoy

Hostname: global-protect-prod.unlockedai.com

Application: Palo Alto firewall

Vulnerability: CVE-2024-3400

Status:  Active


Containment

Rule: attacker.ip is "any"

Action: Block

Head over to the [Investigate page](#) to view any attacks targeting this decoy

Message



Deceive

Deception Command Center

Deception Strategy

AI DECEPTION NEW

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Zero Trust Decoys

AI Deception > GenAI Infra Decoys

Deception can Deploy GenAI Infra Honeypots











Decoys of GenAI infrastructure to detect attacks like prompt injection, data poisoning, jailbreaking, adversarial suffixes, training data extraction and more.

Coming Soon

Decoy	Personality	Description	Type	
sales-llm.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.109	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on top of CRM data	Network	
trainingdata.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.108	LLM	Mimics a data repository with training data	Network	
dev-copilot.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.107	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on an internal code base	Zero Trust	
revops-chatbot.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.106	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on revenue operations data	Network	
appserver.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.104	ADAPTIVE	Mimics a chatbot for employee directory and questions	Zero Trust	

AI Deception > GenAI Infra Deceits

Create New Decoy

Decoy	Personality	Description	Type	
sales-llm.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.109	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on top of CRM data	Network	 
trainingdata.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.108	LLM	Mimics a data repository with training data	Network	 
dev-copilot.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.107	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on an internal code base	Zero Trust	 
revops-chatbot.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.106	LLM	Mimics an LLM model built on revenue operations data	Network	 
appserver.unlockedai.com 10.123.14.104	<div>TH ADAPTIVE</div>	Mimics a chatbot for employee directory and questions	Zero Trust	 

Minimize Attack Surface

Prevent Compromise

Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss


Minimize Attack Surface

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
Prevent Lateral Movement

Prevent Data Loss

Integrated Data Protection for All Data and All Channels



Securing sensitive data from Generative AI





ZIA



Generative AI Security Report

Time Updated: May 16, 2023 12:01 PM

322

GenAI Applications

1.8K

Transactions to GenAI

1.2K


Sensitive Data to GenAI

200

Accessed by Users

AI Application Usage


Transactions



[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)

AI Usage Trends

Transactions



[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)

Sensitive Data Transactions

Transaction

Gen AI Usage by Department


Transaction

8%



● Allowed ● Blocked ● Isolated

[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)




☒ ChatGPT ☒ Microsoft Copilot ☒ Google Gemini ☒ Github Copilot ☒ Perplexity

[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)

Sensitive Data Transactions


Transaction ▼



[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)

Gen AI Usage by Department

Transaction ▼



[View Prompts >](#) [Analyze More >](#)

Sensitive Data by Apps


ChatGPT ▼



Top Users

All AI Applications ▼

Complete contextual visibility of Gen AI Prompts



The screenshot displays a 'Prompts' management interface. At the top, there are filter buttons for Department (All), Application (All), Access Type (All), and Time Frame (Today). A search bar is located on the right. Below the filters is a table with the following columns: User, Department, Application, Prompt, DLP Engine, Location, and Date. The first row of the table is highlighted with a red box.

User	Department	Application	Prompt	DLP Engine	Location	Date
david.b@org...	R&D	ChatGPT	Define addition function def addition(number1, number2): result = number1 + number2 print("Addition result:", result)	Source Code	Pune	Nov 23, 2023;
john@infosys...	Customer Supp...	Google Gemini	Please create a customer response email to his request to bill his credit card #	-	Bangalore	Nov 23, 2023;
jessy@sales..	Billing	ChatGPT	Please create an email for customer John Smith with his invoice details provided below	PII	San Jose	Nov 23, 2023;
john@gmail...	Sales	Google Gemini	Please create a customer response email to his request to bill his credit card #	PCI	Bangalore	Nov 23, 2023;

Understand usage behavior

Identify risky activities

Make informed blocking decisions

Securing data from Gen AI Applications

DLP Inspection

+Add DLP Rule

CRITERIA

Content Matching

☒ Select DLP Engines ☐ None

DLP Engines

Source Code

Source IP Groups

Any

URL Categories

Any

Cloud Applications

ChatGPT

ACTION

Data Traffic

Allow ☒ Block

Cloud App Control (with Browser Isolation)

+Add Cloud App Control Rule

Unselected Items	Selected Items (8)
Search...	Andi
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AI & ML Applications	Character.AI
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ChatGPT	ChatGPT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Andi	Clarifai
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Character.AI	cordial.ai
<input type="checkbox"/> ChatSonic	Decktopus
<input type="checkbox"/> Dall-E	Midjourney
	MyWave

Done Cancel Clear Selection

ACTION

Application Access

Allow Caution Block ☒ Isolate

Daily Bandwidth Quota (MB)

Enter Text

Daily Time Quota (min)

Enter Text

Isolation Profile

None

URL Filtering

+Add URL Filtering rule

Gen

Information Technology

☐ General AI & ML Applications

☐ Generative AI and ML Applications

ACTION

Web Traffic

Allow Caution Block ☒ Isolate



ROHIT
KOHLI

Deputy CISO



Zscaler Zero Trust Architecture Powered by AI

Fight AI



With AI



**Focus on the
Zero Trust
Architecture**

Thank You!